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ABSTRACT 
Improved parastotal performance is increasingly crucial to 
the Kenyan economy because of its macro-economic effects and because 
of the key sectors controlled by paras tatals. There is a concenstis 
that the sector has performed poorly in Kenya, especially in terms 
of profitability and efficiency. In the literature review it is 
shown that no author has articulated a positive theory of how public 
firms respond to their envix-onments,- This lack of a theory of the 
firm has weakened policy analysis in Kenya and elsewhere. It is 
proposed that each firm should be thought of as a coalition between 
consumers, input suppliers, management and stock holders. The 
coalition together produces a surplus, with coalition members 
competing for shares thereof. The performance of a parastatal can 
thus be characterized by the way this surplus is allocated, .A central 
assumption of this model is that management will behave strategically 
to appropriate its share of the surplus, rather than passively 
obeying the wishes of the stockholders. Analysis of a firm's per-
formance then turns into an examination of the mechanisms by which 
a coalition member can increase its share in the surplus. Policy 
prescriptions revolve around strengthening or weakening those 
mechanisms, taking into account the likely responses of other 
actors in the coalition. There is sufficient richness of experience 
in the parastatal sector in Kenya that it should be possible, 
through a careful comparative study, to demonstrate the effectiveness 
or lack thereof, of various types of controls which have been 
proposed. 
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I, Statement of Problem 
In Kenya, as in most of sub-'Saharan Africa, a .major 
portion of investment is channelled through government owned corpora-
tions, called parastatals. The reasons given for government participa-
tion in directly productive activities are "to decolonize the economy, 
promote development- and regional balance, increase citizen participa-
1 
tion in the oconomy and ensure greater public control of the economy." 
This participation by government has been effected through 147 statu-
tory boards, 47 companies owned wholly by the government or the 
statutory boards, 36 companies' in which the government owns a contro-
lling interest and 93 companies in which the government has a minority 
shareholding position. These enterprises are found in many sectors 
of the economy, including strategic and infrastructural industries 
such as banking and finance, transport, energy, communications and 
export commodities. .It also includes investments in nonstr-otegic 
sectors such as textiles, shoes, sugar, tyres alcohol, canning, 
3 
salt, paper, radios, fishing, beverages and food processing. In 
1976 parastatals contributed more than 10% of G.D.P, and accoun-
ted for a similar portion of capital formaticn.^ 
Because parastatals control so many key sectors it is 
important that they perform well. S^me have functioned efficiently, 
producing goods and services in a technically efficient manner 
and earning profits. Most, however, have performed poorly, wasting-
resources and requiring large subsidies. The consequences of an 
inefficient parastatal sector are grave. 
1. Working Party on Government Expenditures, Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Working Party, July, 1982. 
2. Ibid,, p . 40. 
3. Por a complete list of Kenya's parastatals, see ibid., pp.. 93-8. 
4. Hans G. Klaus, "Parastatals in Kenya: Analysis of Their 
condition and Methods for an Improved Performance," Institute for 
Development Studies Working Paper No.' 370, University of Nairobi, 
June, 1979. 
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The importance of good performance in the parastatal 
sector has been recognized in Kenya, According to the recent 
Working Party on Government Expenditures, "Examples of unsound and 
poorly controlled investments can readily be found,.. The amounts 
involved are of such a magnitude that if they had been directed 
toward the development of essential rural infrastructure, several k
 . 5 
districts could have been radically transformed..." According 
to the Ndegwa Committee "These shortcomings... constitute a 
serious threat to tlje economy and it is, therefore, a matter of 
extreme urgency that steps should be taken to overcome them. The 
economic and social costs of^delay in taking action to remedy 
these serious problems ai-e simply unacceptable," 
While the urgency, of reform is acknowledged, Kenya's 
parastatals continue to be a heavy burden on the nation's finances, 
"By 1982 cumulative investment t§ by Government, including guaranteed 
debt of parastatals, exceeded K£ 900 million. At a rate of return 
of 10 per cent, Government should be realizing K£90 million per 
annum in dividends* Instead., in 1978/79 dividends paid to the 
Exchequer amounted to only KS2.2 million and were paid by only 
7 
six parastatals, This_ poor record of returns reflects the poor 
way in which most parastatals are operated. The Ndegwa Committee 
found that "there is clear evidence of prolonged inefficiency, 
financial .mismanagement, wastb" and malpractices in many parastatals,"
8 
The Nd'egwa Committee emphasized the confused chain of 
command experienced by parastatals. They noted that "because of 
the confusion which exists', it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to say where responsibility for waste or inefficiency lies and there 
is a growing tendency to attempt to shift blame to others when things 
go wrong. A confused sitiiation of this sort can be exploited in 
5. Working Party, op. cit., p. 38, 
6. Review of Statutory Boards; Report and Recommendations of .the 
Committee Appointed by His Excellency the President, May 1979, p. 22 
(Hereafter referred to as the "ITdegwa Committee Report") 
7. Working Party, op. cit. p. 41. 
8. Ndegwa Committee Report, op. cit., p. 3 
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many ways, e.g. to resist public accountability and to engage in 
corruption and nepotism,"9 
While the M e g w a Committee perceived confusion and 
contradiction in policy toward parastatals, the Committee scarcely 
dealt with the source of these problems. The source of much of the 
confusion and contradiction in policy is the multiplicity of 
public enterprise goals. 
Enterprises which have been assigned multiple objectives 
must make tradeoffs between them. Even if management were "effi-
cient" so that the firm is on a production possibility frontier 
of its goals, the pursuit of some goals must mean a curtailment 
in pursuit of others, An evaluation of a firm using only one 
criterion, such as technical efficiency, when the firm has been 
pursuing other objectives, such as maximizing employment or 
self-sufficiency in basic commodities, will naturalljr show the 
firm as being inefficient in achieving the single goali 
It seems that in Kenya public enterprises have been 
pursuing a number of objectives which the M e g w a Committee labia 
as "political" and hence assumes to be illegitimate. The very 
existence of the M e g w a Committee and its follow-up by the Working 
Party on Expenditures suggest that the balance _of power in Kenyan 
politics is now shifting to favor efficiency and profitability 
goals over other goals. The problem of reform of parastatals can 
be viewed as one of a search for mechanisms by which the group 
which favors efficiency and profitability can ensure that those 
goals are given precedence over others. 
If reforms are to be successful, they must be based on 
a realistic theory of both the firm and the envix-onment in which 
it operates. Many of the reforms which have been proposed involve 
new control .mecb.anis.ns imposed, on the .firm by the state. Yet 
such controls may increase the politicization of some aspects of 
firm performance in ways which will actually lead to worse per-
9. M e g w a Committee Report, op. cit., p . 3, 
- 4 - IDS A"? 409 
formance. To discuss reforms intelligently, we need a comprehen-
sive and consistent theory of what factors determine firra perfor-
mance. 
In the review of- the literature on public enterprise, it 
will be shown that past studies have sufferedlbecause they did not 
have a realistic theory of firm behavior. They also lacked a 
systematic theory of what political pressures were likely to be 
applied to different firms and how performance would be affected. 
Based on the literature review a theory of public 
enterprise will be proposed which explains firm performance as 
resulting from.competition between pressure groups which attempt 
to appropriate as much,an possible of the surplus generated by the 
firm* The performance of a firm can thus be characterised by the ^ 
way the surplus is shared between consumers, input suppliers, 
management and stockholders. Policy analysis of a firm will focus 
on the mechanisms available to each of the pressure groups in its 
i 
struggle to secure its share of the surplus, 
II. Review of Literature 
In considering the problem of how parastatals in Africa 
can be made to function effectively one can tap literature in 
several different fields. In the literature review which follows 
the contributions of each field are described, with mention made 
of representative works and authors. 
The economic literature on public enterprise can be 
divided into two categories, normative and positive. The former 
category is better developed. 
The normative literature on public enterprise builds on 
basic welfare economics. One outstanding example of this literature 
is Baumol and Bradford's "Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost 
. . . . . X - 5 - • ID3/V/P/409 
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Pricing" which was-developed primarily in reference to
1 
nationalized industry- ahd only secondarily applied to regulation 
problems. This'-literature also'includes treatments" of the'problem 
in a dynamic context. Perhaps the "most elaborate exa.nple of this 
• . -'' • .. .' ' • ^ •••' 1-1 • " •,)-••: IJ .'hv V a a ' i x q 
is the UNIDO Project Evaluation Guidelines.' This literature 
is relatively k^tttre 'and well-developed, it is' useful' for the 
, , idO&£U/OOOC 
setting of policy goals, .... • 
:.•'.-•':.;'{ c JM.// cs " / " 
.; : ' Tha oh pu'blic' enterprise ...: 
i"s
!
 positive ra'ther 'than norma t'ivd
j
Ih&teai3: of asking "iiow' should 
public enterprises,- beha^ve 'so as to* maximize soeiaT welfare?" it,; 
:
a'£3.ks "how do_ public Enterprisesact^ -uader 'given 'conditions?" • 
, . i n u h . r r D'0.r;!:£UjT3"a v j r o u i ttc 'ix a i c s q e c o jraod 
Thus,, it'.at"fc'e.mp-t&''-
,
toprovide
 ;
a" tiieory of: 'the firm, . _ Such ' a theory 
should predic t how a-- public firm will, behave when-xrontrun 
.,, r .r" f • •r.n.->i!'-T Kffa S QS'XCtlS&fiS 0 t fcfi"J • K « « •'•• 1 
d i f f ereh t...e^vix^naeivts.,t ^v-i-ronm*irfc 
considered is different constraints put on the public firm by; the. 
' X C j! V ' P C f.'': pB^Sffwwn! l i t . f c f t . ' - ' i - ^ l . - ' - i r ^ . ' t • " 
state. This: 1 it:erp.ture:.»S,s- ."imder&evelopedjlai-gely- unsa'tisf 
C * ;" " ' - . ' :. ,< •' f -'. ' . - r-: r H-i •': i v :t>%P ^ • M 
tory.' It is to this area" that the proposed research will contribute. 
Evaluations of public enterprises have been weakened by 
the void which exists where a theory of, the firm ought to be. Por 
example, the World Bank recently published a study of state manufac-
• 12 
turing firms in Turkey. This study illustrates the methodological 
gap to-be filled. Walstedt carefully evaluates the efficiency of 
state firms in several sectors. By comparing productivity of 
capital and labor with international data from the same industries 
he concludes that they have performed :inefficiently, In-arriving 
at this conclusion, Walstedt carefully'.corrects for distortions 
caused by wage, price and currency controls. He goes on to give 
recommendations for how to reorganize the state sector for greater 
10. W , Baumol and D. Bradford, "optimal Departures from.Marginal 
Cost Pricing,'I ..-American.Economic Review, • June 1970, pp. 
265-283. 
1-1 .- tTni ted ••Nations Industrial D'eyelopment Organization, Guidelines 
for Project Evaluation, United Nations, 1972. 
12, Bertil Walstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in a-Mixed 
Economy; the Turkish Case, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1980. '-•:._ , - >-•• -
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While this might seen an obvious, point, the problem has 
been difficult in practice because of the many seemingly nonquantifi-
oble-goals .which parastatals are supposed to pursue. Jones choraia 
that cany of these..goals arc net by the existence of public enter-
prise and require no further deviations from profit maximizing 
behavior, though a lower rate of profit nay be acceptable. 
However, market distortions cake shadow pricing necessary in 
calculating public profit. But shadow pricing remains an inexact 
practice and it will be difficult to base managers' evaluations 
on it. Thus it seems likely that efforts to evaluate public 
enterprise will continue to be plagued by a multiplicity of non-
eommonsurable goals, which weakens the ability of public monitors 
to serve as effective watchdogs of public firm behavior. 
Aharoni has made a promising beginning at an attempt to 
1 5 
model the public firm. Yet, his paper " still suffers from a 
basic confusion as to the nature and behavior of the firm. 
Aharoni assumes that firms will seek to maximize "manage-
rial discretion." He takes his definition of managerial discretion 
from Williamson. ° Managerial'discretion is the "ability of mana-
gers to choose and pursue objeo-tives and strategies that differ 
from those of the owner-." This is equivalent to saying that mana-
gers appropriate some of the firm's resources. Aharoni gives a 
list of factors which will contribute to managerial discretion in 
public firms, For example, firms which ean finance new investment 
out of retained earnings will have more discretion than firms which 
have to submit their requests through the national- budgetary procedure. 
Firms which fall under the jurisdiction of more than one ministry 
will experience greater discretion because•they can exploit the 
resulting ambiguity in -instructions. 
Aharoni is on the right track here in that he views, 
public firm nanagers a ^ behaving strategically to further their 
objectives, rather than assuming, as in'orthodox economic models, • 
15. Yair Aharoni,. "Managerial Discretion," in Rayaond Vernon and 
Yair Aharoni, .'eds., State-Owned Enterprise .in the. Wes.tern Economies, 
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981. . ... 
16. 01 
iver Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior; 
Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, H.J., 1964-
: T Q j Y C x l 9 a v - i retold-9"xosl'I ±c .ZQ^0^0^!^ , ncAOOIRXXIW T S VXIO .di 
.IXcH yoxd-Joil ,:.=•)• j o:'.? Vu.'. . o :ii GavltoafrtfO lofi&fiWfqaQ 
,ASCX P , I»»"F
 R
'?L'IXX0 S O O W E X S A A 
that aanagers act as instruments of owners. But a curious ambivalence 
as to what managerial objectives are exists in Aharoni's paper. 
j/iccpr.ding tP Williamson,^maijagerial discretion leads to- thick.icarpets, 
.fat expense-accounts and; oyer-larg(2 personal,fiefdpms, /Hence mana-
gerial.,, discretion is a. source of inefficiency. . iy<s o4 i>vsd 
v-xj'ainin- ono ncrf*. e-ioa to xioid-oifcaliut
 0 !
 's.obms xlQ-i :voxr-w '&>-.ir'l 
edj o r o l f ^ ^ & B ^ ^ i n f . BSBf 5s W^fio ttWSse'l^ have .[.gotten I X±w 
turned on its head, , His e x a m ^ l ^ o ! G^n&greriqlvdis/p.retroni^lliutvj'i 
• seem to involve an enterprise resisting pressure to go along with 
sone as.ug^jd),
 s
u c h 
exa.mpl
:
ea ^ ncl.^de ^ u ^ ^ g . plants- in ;unfavorabl.e . locations, o>xt X • uq 
pur;-c,hosing, ^ npu^ts yfFjQffrj-Qthe..^  pf?ras.tj3tals. cWhi&ih off;er i; cfo 
terms, etc. While it is never explicitly stated-,—it soomo that—-
public • gea^-qjtfv^
e
rfow -^'ceme^^cliampfohstfe
c
 ^uHTic 
iriteres t--a hdr
-
e-ne.m±es~ ^ - - b ^ r r i ^ i ^ ^ q f j ^ ^ ^ ' f Q nd, -sto p -sga p.. mea b ur es 
designed to redistribute income. 
How can such a remarkable transformation occur? How can 
managerial discretion look so different to Williamson in the 
private sector and to Aharoni in the public sector? The answer 
is simple if one starts from the assumption that public managers 
are like private managers. They can be expected to resist any 
measure which cuts into their discretionary realm,. Additional 
tasks for their enterprise will reduce discretion. .So, they can 
be expected to resist political interference. This is quite . - . 
-••Vr j j.o.L'X1BO •-<.:.: r ' '.:;.< at :'-' • .. J.J..CW 
different from saying that they seek to maximize social,welfare 
and operate efficiently. Aharoni and many other authors who argue 
in favor of public enterprise autonomy have by and large been 
fooled'by a history of public firms' resisting political pressures 
into a naive view of how such firms will behave when given autonomy. 
:-,. - , .. studies, of Kenya'.s .parpstatal.s which hove been done 
in Kenya have also suffered . from a tonfused implicit theory of 
the firm. Reports listing problems with parastatala typically con-
17 tain problems at every different, levels. p®r example, one list' 
17. See Hans. G, Klaus in his "Analysis and Survey of the Conference," 
in "The Role of Public Enterprises in Development in "Eastern Africa: 
Proceedings of a Workshop Organised by the Institute for Development 
Studies," I.D.S, Occasional Paper Ho. 39. The conference took place 
4-7 November, 1-980. ' -
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pointed out that unqualified .managers are appointed for political 
reasons. In the sane list another problem cited was that mainte-
nance plans and inventory lists were inadequate. Surely the 
latter problem is a result of the former and therefore belongs in 
a separate analytical category. 
Some authors have written detailed descriptions of the 
accountability structures of-public enterprise. Cassesse did this 
for France, Italy and England.
 L
 He concludes that in these 
countries public firms provide enough information for the type of 
performance evaluation which Jones proposed. However, the infor-
mation seems to go virtually unused. Oyugi comes to - the same 
1 9 
conclusion for Kenya. Anyane-Ntow confirmed the same phenomenon 
2'0 
in Ghanaian public enterprise. This suggests that the problem 
with public enterprises may not lie in that they respond poorly 
to incentives but rather that the political system-is incapable 
of providing proper incentives. This is the conclusion reached 
by Oyugi: 
"The problem facing the parastatals in Kenya can be 
analysed at two levels, namely, at the level of poli-
cymaking and also at the level of internal management. 
The policymaking function is one which the enterprise 
shares with many other interested parties. In the case 
of a public enterprise, the government, at least 
theoretically, is a critical actor, Where the govern-
ment fails to play its. part or neglects it altogether, 
a public enterprise is likely to go astray or even 
collapse. 
18. Sabino Cassesse, "Public Control and Corporate Efficiency," 
in Raymond Vernon and Yair Aharoni, eds'., State-Owned Enterprise 
in the Western Economies, St, Martin's Press, Hew York, 1981, 
19. W.O. Oyugi, "Government and Public Enterprises: Some 
Observations on Kenya." in Hons Klaus and S.E. Migot-Adholla, 
eds., The Role of Public Enterprises in Development in East 
Africa, Proceedings of a Workshop organized by the Institute 
for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 4 - 7 November, 
1980. Occasional Paper No. 3 9 , 1.982, p. 7 3 , 
20. Kwabena Anyane-ITtow, ".The Use of Accounting Information in 
Structuring Decision Making and the Management of State Controlled 
Business Enterprises in Ghana: Accounting and Economic Development 
Revisited," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of 
Georgia, 1982, 
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Lack of external stimuli in the form of policy guide-
lines leads to laxity in the organization and eventually 
to disintegration of the organizational system. The 
disintegration comes about as a result of the managers 
beginning to promote their own 'particularistic
1 
interests, as opposed to the public interest in the 
absence of 'external' concern for the latter. In 
some cases the neglect may lead to goal displacement as 
the managers alter the original goals to suit their own 
perspectives or interests.... The practice is widespread 
in Kenya...."
 2 1 
This is an important fact which must be considered in any 
"analysis which hopes-to point the way to improved parastatal per-
formance, as it suggests that we should focus our attention not 
on the firm itself but on the complex political interplay which 
is the source of the firm's signals' and the incentive System 
unier which management operates. While this is a much more 
daunting task} it may not be so impossible as Oyugi suggests; 
"(The HdegWO Committee Recommendations) .. are based on 
somewhat false p r e m i s e s — that the problem is one of 
lack of effective management and that adjustments in 
this area could bring about the desired effect. My sub-
mission is that the problem is more intricate than it 
appears. It involves restructuring of the basic value 
• orientation of the political-bureaucratic elites in the 
society. It involves the. introduction and institution-
alization of acceptable ethical standards in public and 
private life if practices such as corruption, nepotism, 
etc. hove to be eradicated altogether."22 
Indeed, the proposed research will attempt to show that 
there are some reforms more modest than "the introduction,-, of 
acceptable ethical standards" which can have some positive effect 
on parastatal performance* 
The evidence suggests then that in order to explain, 
the performance of different public enterprises one must examine 
what pressures are exerted" an"".the firms, by whom, and by what, 
means. -Differential performance can then be understood as resulting 
from a different configuration of pressures at work on each firm. 
2 1
 • Oyugi, op. ext. , p. 65.7 . 
22 Ibid., p. 77. 
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Fortunately, the th^cret'loVij. basis for such a no d el al-
ready exists. There- is r largo and -rowing literature on politi-
cal econony models wh.
:
.eh ;:>tt2n?t to node] redistributive policies, 
Triese models beer vs-ed to explain the pattern x? provision 
of public goods, the pattern oi the tax burden and spending 
policies, patterns of tariff protection, and patterns of economic 
regulation. 
Thn models all proceed by dropping the assumption, so 
conventional elsewhere in ec^ociies, *hat government acts as a 
benevolent social welfare maxtmizer seeking only to correct 
market failure and to sjz~ lareio optinality, Rather, the 
models assume taa - policies "re made derneeratically by politicians 
seeking to maximize their welfare by responding to constituents 
who maximize their, own welfare, fhen costs of information and 
voting are added to such a m-dol, the way is 'open for redistribu-
tive polioies which will rot. ]• Pare to optimal. Some of these 
models (for example» Ho'Jor.tir'.ok and "ollj^on and Landes and Posner) 
have focussed on institution' j details such as bicameral legisla-
tures and the independent ;'u?.ic Lary, Others (like Peltzman) have 
proposed models virtually devoid of institutional detail. 
Of cour.io one ^'ishoo to go beyond the recognition that 
in a democratic System with ;rnnsa«tion costs r^distributive 
policies are possible, One would like to be able to predict what 
groups are likely to in, powerful in diverting resources to themselves, 
and who will bear the "co3tn« fortunately, some other n v thors 
considering somewhat different qur^otiens hove'node contributions 
which can be used in con;vT notion .with these political economy 
models to predict public firm behavior. They permit the formula-
~ tion of hypotheses about what pressure groups will act on a par-
ticular firm and which groups a r r likely to succeed at having their 
demands net, 
Mancur Olson wrj.to" about
 J
-hn problem of when a group will 
2 3 form to act in the members
1
 collective interest and v/hen it will not. 
23. Mancur Olson, fhe" Logic o± Collect! e Action: • Public Good_s 
and the The or-- of G-roupd,. "nurvf-ru onivf r-ity Press ] Cambridge,' '..965 
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He identifies the si
z
e of the group and the concentration of 
benefits as key variables. If the group is large there will be 
a free rider problem and the collective action v/ill collapse, as 
in the case of a competitive industry unable to sustain a price 
above marginal cost. If the group is small or if the benefits 
ore concentrated in a few hands, the group will be able to coalesce 
as in the case of a cartel or an industry with a dominant firm, 
Olson further suggests that there are two possible ways 
in which large pressure groups con form. They eon use coercion. 
Or, alternatively, they can use some non-collective good as an 
inducement to join. In this latter instance, the group must have 
some monopoly power in the .. provision of the non-collective good 
in order to use it to extract rent which can be devoted to lobbying 
for favorable regulation, or whatever the collective good is, 
2 4 
Pfeffer and Salancik develop a general model of organi 
zationol behavior which they.then apply to private firms. Accordin 
to their model, a firm, like any other organization, is a coalition 
of actors, rather that a rational entity which maximizes some 
objective function, Naturally, different members of the coalition 
which moke up the organization will have demands which may conflict 
The outcome of such a coalition will depend on the complex interac-
tion of competing demands, The result will depend on the ability 
of each member of the coalition to press its own claims, Pfeffer 
and Salancik list the factors which will increase the probability 
24. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik, The External Control of 
Organizations: a Resource Dependence Perspective, Harper and' 
Row, New York, 1978, See especially pp. 23-28, 
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that a pressure group's demands, on an organization will "be satisfied. 
These factors can be summarized by saying that a pressure group will 
be more powerful if it has control of some resource which is impor-
tant to the firm, and if the firm doesn't have control over 
a resource important to the pressure group. 
According to this view of the firm, efficiency or ineffi-
ciency will be .merely a byproduct of the balancing of competing 
demands. Most of the actors .making the demands will find efficiency 
to be of only minimal interest.. Rather, customers will care only 
about price and quality, the Treasury about profits, suppliers 
about the price and quantity of inputs. Even when there are actors 
who «are explicitly about efficiency, it will be experienced simply 
as one more competing demand. 
The literature on corporate control will be useful in 
analyzing which pressure groups will be most successful in achieving 
desirable outcomes from the public firm. The feature which makes 
it so useful is that it drops the assumption made in more orthodox 
'economic models that a firm acts as a monolithic individual .maxi-
mizing some objective function* Instead it recognizes that a firm 
is an amalgamation of individuals, each with his or her own objectives. 
Particular emphasis is given to how owners control, .managers., which 
should be especially useful when analyzing how..the government exer-
cises its responsibility as stockholder in public firms. 
Oliver Williamson has developed and tested models where 
management has the opportunit:/ to pursue its own objectives in 
25 
addition to that of profit for the stockholders. He shows tha~c 
this behavior develops when external pressure on the firm to :behave 
efficiently are weak or absent. The situation of the parastatals 
would seem to epitomize the lack of external pressure"for efficiency. 
25. The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives 
in a Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, 1964» 
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2 6 
More r e c e n t l y , W i l l i a m s o n has noted that large firms are 
actually bureaucracies; most activity is carried out by salaried 
staff with no direct stake in the outcome. These large firms have 
been able to overcome problems of internal control in order to 
grow large enough to take advantage of economies of scale, William-
son devotes several chapters to these problems of internal control 
and how they can be overcome. Much of this material can be applied 
equally well to public firms, 
Alfred Chandler has also examined the effects of organiza-
tional form on productivity. He has written histories of U.S. firms 
in which he shows how they gradually learned how to.solve the control 
problem as they grew larger and were forced to rely on salaried 
27 
managers. He pinpoints the organizational innovations which were 
important in allowing firms to grow to take advantage of economies 
of scale. He focuses especially on how managers were made accoun-
table for their division
1
s performance and on the evolution of a 
rational division of responsibility. Chandler provides many in-
sights into how organization affected firms' performance. 
Conclusion to Literature Review 
Existing studies of public enterprise have suffered for 
lack of a model of how . such enterprises can be expected to 
behove. There exist sufficient analytical .tools, to construct such 
a model. The literature on positive theories of regulation suggests 
that the problem should be conceptualized as a conflict between 
pressure groups lobbying for income redistribution in their favor. 
The organizational theory literature can be used to predict what in-
terest' groups will attempt to influence the behavior of the firm. 
The corporate control literature will be helpful in predicting how 
the firm will arbitrate these conflicting demands. 
26. Markets and Heirarchies, The Free Press, Hew York, 1975. 
27. The Visible Hand, The Belknap Press., Cambridge, 1977, 
- 15 - IDS A"? 409 
III. Model 
Each public firm is the focus of a set of pressure groups 
which push for policies on the part of the firm which will be 
favorable to them. Pirn behavior can be characterized as o vector 
of outcomes (output prices, input prices, efficiency, profitability, 
etc.) some of which are of interest to each of the pressure groups. 
The firm's behavior Will depend on the Relative strength of the 
different pressure groups, 
i j ' ; ^ 
The most important pressure groups which act on public 
firms are: 
1) consumers, who. press for low prices, 
2) suppliers of inputs
;
 who press for high input prices and pro-
curement from themselves, 
3) competitors, who press for high prices, and restrictions on 
services offered, 
4) management, which acts to ensure that the firm generates a 
continuing stream of surplus from which it will attempt to 
appropriate a portion for its own consumption, and 
5) stockholders, who press for the firm to earn profits. 
This model of a public firm can be used to characterize 
the behavior of public firms, Por any particular firm it can be 
noted to which, if any, of the outside pressure groups the firm seems 
to have been particularly responsive, that is whether to consumers, 
input suppliers, competitors or stock holders. One can then focus 
on cases where the firm is seen to be improperly responsive and 
examine the .mechanisms • by Which pressure is exerted, with a view 
to strengthening or weakening them accordingly. 
This model will help to focus attention on a useful set 
of questions, and help to" avoid a number of less useful ones. 
In particular, in analysis of public enterprise, there is a tempta-
tion for the analyst'to get caught up in analyzing where the firm has 
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gone wrong. Before long, the analyst is either recommending the 
preparation of, or actually preparing, such things as operating 
and forward budgets, inventory lists, accounting procedures, etc. 
Thus the outside analyst is, in fact, attempting-to perform . 
managementte . role. This js unsuitable. If the management is 
competent, they con perform those tasks, and with greater familia-•
 r 
rity with the firm's operations than an outsider can hope -to gain. 
In such a case, the analyst should be focussing on what are the 
Incentives and constraints within which management operates, and 
how can they be restructured to encourage managers to do their jobs 
If management is not competent, then ad hee interventions by out-
siders cannot be expected to turn around a firm's operations.. 
The proposed model gives a different emphasis. It en-
courages questions such as the following: \
;
iho are the main actors 
that affect an enterprise? What are their goals? To w h a t extent 
have they achieved them? Whot mechanisms have they used? What 
new arrangements might change management behavior which policy 
makers consider undesirable? How would these new arrangements 
change the reward structure within which management operates? 
Success in reforming the parastatal sector depends on 
a realistic understanding of the firm and how it responds to its 
environment. Policies which ignore the motivations and behavior 
of managers may .make things even worse. Por example, imagine a 
firm which has been running relatively well in terms of efficiency 
and profits. It has been retaining and reinvesting most of its 
profits. How suppose it is desired that the firm should continue 
its operations as before, with the exception that profits should 
be turned over to the Treasury. If one takes an instrumental view 
of managers, i.e. assumes that they behave passively as instructed 
without attempting to promote their own interest, the case seems 
1 7 
simple. One simply takes the decision on disposition of paras-
tatai surpluses out of the hands of the Board and lodges it instead 
with the Treasury. 
However, a more "sophisticated analysis quickly reveals 
tha't the proposed change in policy causes a drastic change in the 
reward system which applies to .managers. Previously managers 
had ah'incentive to keep costs'down and servise quality high because 
the resulting profits could be used for expansion. Managers derive 
prestige and power as the size of thoir operation expands. If 
managers are suddenly deprived of their discretion over the sur-
plus, they may lose the incentive to generate such a surplus. 
They may appropriate it in other ways allowing costs to rise and 
service quality to fall, if the resulting repercussions are of 
no consequence to managers, Viewed in this light, it may be better 
to institute profit sharing or managerial bonuses, or some other 
scheme for transferring profits to the Treasury without vitiating 
managerial initiative. 
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IV Directions for Future Work 
The chief goal is to demonstrate, based on past performance, 
what policies can lead to increased profitability and efficiency in the 
parastatal sector. The performance in the parastatal sector has not been 
uniformly bad, as the impression is sometimes given. By studying the 
differences in performance and differences in the manner of operations, 
within the framework of the model presented, one should be able to learn 
a great deal about what factors contribute to efficient and profitable 
performance. 
No one has ever compiled a data base which would permit a 
systematic comparative study of .parastatal performance. Therefore, the 
first project will be to do so. Such a data base will draw heavily on an-
nual reports for the 25 to 30 largest parastatals, from indepenaence or 
their date of inception, whichever is later,.to the most recent data avai-
lable. From these reports one can aornpile data on trends in sales, prices, 
costs',operating profit, net profit, employment, assets, productivity of 
capital and labor, aebt service, sources of finance, disposition of sur-
plus, etc. 
In addition to the afore mentioned time series, one can collect 
information on turnover among directors and senior management.' One can 
gather a record of major events which affect firm performance, such as 
border closures, changes in ownership, diversification, capital re-
structuring, changes in divisionalization, or changes in the responsi-
bilities assigned by the government. One can get a feel for certain aspects 
in the politico-economic environment of each firm. Which firms have had 
continued battles over price controls? Which have pushed for and been 
granted high levels of protection? Which have been propped up by receiving 
grants of monopoly status, and which have been denied such protection? 
The information from annual reports can be supplemented with other data, 
especially data on prices of internationally traded goods. 
When all this information has been assembled, an interesting 
and thought provoking picture of the parastatal sector should emerge. 
One will be able to see, for example, which firms have never been allowed 
to charge prices which cover their costs, and which firms are protected so 
that they can charge prices high above the international price. Some 
firms have been able to finance ibheir expansion out of retained earnings, 
allowing them substantial autonomy, while other firms have carried for-
ward losses every year, making them dependent on special .loans and subven-
tions from their parent ministry. Some firms have been more responsive to 
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their input suppliers than others. Some have been more profitable than 
others. Some have been more efficient than others. 
Using -such a data- base., one should be able to test a series 
of hypotheses on control of parastatals in Kenya. For example, a common 
proposal for reform is to .require government approval for all new invest-
ment. In Kenya seme parastatals have de facto had to acquire such approval, 
since they are dependent on outside finance, while others have had greater 
freedom. What does the record show about the efficacy of requiring such 
project review? Other reform proposals center around constraining the 
salaries paid by parastat.'als. Some firms have offered very attractive 
terms of employment while others have not. Can any lessons be learned by 
comparing their experiences? 
The data base can also be used to spotlight cases where some be-
haviour which is considerea undesirable has persisted. Then it can be 
used to suggest other firms with better records on that count, so that a 
more-detailed enquiry can be made to find the reasons for the difference. 
For example, sane firms, even though profitable, seldom or never declare 
dividends, while others remit dividends regularly, What accounts for the 
difference in behavior? What are the likely repercussions? 
While the data base shouiu be useful in showing trends ana 
suggesting comparisons, to take full advantage of therichness of experience 
available, one must use more detailed case studies. Interviews with 
parastatal managers and ministry officials will be used to supplement the 
statistical information from the data base. 
Conclusion 
Previous studies have been weakened by their lack of a consistent 
theory of how public firms behave and how they respond to their environment. 
The outlines for such a model have, been presented. The proposed model has 
two essential features; 1) Managers act strategically to further their own 
interests, and 2) Management arbitrates between conflicting demands from other 
pressure groups, each of which controls resources essential to the firm. 
Using this framework, the analyst can focus on the particular mechanism 
available to each pressure group. At present the model is skeletal. It 
requires numerous case studies to flesh it out. Yet it provides a useful way 
of making sense of the wide variety of experience within the parastatal 
sector. This variation in performance has previously been largely ignored 
by most analysts. Careful analysis of the varied performance in the parastatal 
sector, within the-framework suggested, can reveal a great deal about what 
results can be expected from prcposea policy reforms. 
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